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In 1962, the Section of Taxation of the American Bar
Association undertook a pilot project study of substantive tax
reform. That study recently has been announced as completed and
the results published jointly by the American Bar Foundation and
Southern Methodist University. The collection of essays and the
report of data obtained from the study indicate that lawyers have
fallen short of making an important contribution to the study, except
to the extent that one must credit them with beginning and obtaining
the financing for it. This is not to denigrate their efforts. Arthur
Willis, the project director, and Dean Charles 0. Galvin, Chairman
of the Special Committee on Substantive Tax Reform, have given
unstintingly of their time, and the harassment which they describe
in the book has surely contributed to what I believe is an
incomplete job at this point. So whatever criticism I offer should
not be read as a failure to recognize the value of the services
rendered by them and their committee.
Perhaps one should question from the outset what is meant by
"substantive tax reform." It appears from the history of the
project, written by Dean Charles 0. Galvin, that this phrase was
intended to distinguish a reform involving broad and fundamental
changes in tax policy from the great volume of studies and
recommendations involving technical and relatively narrow aspects
of the tax law on which tax lawyers, over the years, have done an
admirable job. The resolution of the Board of Governors of the
American Bar Association charged the Section of Taxation with
engaging in research leading towards the objectives of "establishing
a fair and equitable tax'system, broadening the tax base, and
providing incentives for work and investment."' Dean Galvin's
;ummary of the history of the project would have benefitted
I The resolution in full provided as follows:
I. The continuance of inquiry and research by appropriate committees of the
Section of Taxation leading to the objectives of establishing a fair and equitable tax
system, broadening the tax base, and providing incentives for.work and investment,
and
2. the consideration of specific measures designed to achieve the objectives in
paragraph 1, which will have the effect of
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immensely had he been able to inform us how this particular
charge was chosen and to what extent it may have inhibited the
objectivity of the study. To establish a fair and equitable tax
system might in itself involve broadening the tax base. Thus,
reading between the lines of the two stated objectives of
"broadening the tax base" and "providing incentives for work and
investment" suggests that the American Bar Association was at
least as concerned with reducing the rates of tax on income as it
was in providing for a fair and equitable system. This is further
suggested by three of the items in the second part of the resolution
of the American Bar Association, where several measures are
suggested as means of achieving the objectives listed in the first
portion of the resolution. These are providing for a maximum rate
of forty percent, "ameliorating or eliminating the double taxation
of corporate income," and "establishing . . . a rate structure...
[for] corporate incomes not in excess of the maximum rate on
individual incomes."
The project began with high hopes that it would demonstrate an
important role for lawyers to play in a multi-disciplinary approach
to tax reform. To what had long been considered the province
primarily of economists, the Section of Taxation ambitiously
hoped to make a substantial contribution. At the annual meeting of
the Section of Taxation in 1969, the report of the Chairman of the
Section expressed great concern with the limited role that the
American Bar Association had been able to play in tax reform
because of the organizational structure of the Association. Thus,
the interest of tax lawyers in breaking away from their role as
technicians and advisers on little bits and pieces of the tax law is
growing. But the recently published study raises some doubts as to
whether lawyers will be able to shed their roles as technicians,
(a) insuring that every person able to do so pay in taxes his fair share of the cost
of government;
(b) including in gross income items not now included and curtailing special
benefits and personal nonbusiness deductions;
(c) establishing with respect to individual incomes a graduated rate structure
with a maximum rate of approximately 40%;
(d) establishing with respect to corporate incomes a rate structure which
would tax corporate incomes not in excess of the maximum rate on individual
incomes;
(e) ameliorating or eliminating the double taxation of corporate income; and
(f modifying the estate and gift tax structure in the interest of simplification,
greater fairness and equity, and consistency with the income tax.
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and advocates for special interests, and move into the field
of making policy judgments on broad-based questions about
subjects where they do in fact have a quality of experience
unmatched by any other experts dealing with the subject.
This doubt is raised by the contents of this study which appear
to be almost entirely the work of economists employed by the
project. The major work of the project appears to be that done by
Attiat F. and David J. Ott, both economists, who have written the
bulk of the published material and who may have done an even
larger portion of the actual work of the project. The Otts'
contribution consists of a study of the first-order revenue effects of
approximately nineteen possible changes in the federal income tax
law. A first-order revenue effect is simply the revenue gain or loss
estimated to result from a particular change in the law. These
revenue estimates are done routinely by the Treasury Department
upon request by Congress. Nevertheless, the Otts describe their
study as a pioneering one because of the fact that they estimated
not only the aggregate amount of excluded income as a result of
certain provisions now in the law, but also the distribution of the
aggregate of excluded income among adjusted gross income classes.
To do this, they used a variety of statistical methods and the
mathematics of probability. The validity of what they have done
in this regard is beyond my ability to evaluate, and I believe that
most lawyers will find themselves in the same position. This simply
underlines the fact that this is largely a study undertaken by
economists and to say that this is a multi-disciplinary study in
its present state overstates the contribution of the lawyers.
With respect to the claim that this is a pioneering approach to
the analysis of first-order revenue effects, I can only comment that
revenue estimates will frequently be divided by adjusted gross income
classes in treasury reports prepared at the direction of congressional
committees. Thus, the Treasury Department appears to be
analyzing both the aggregate and distributional effects of imputing
presently excluded income. I do not mean to imply that scholars
should rely on the Treasury Department for all their data. Clearly
the studies of the Treasury Department do not always provide the
particular information scholars wish to have. Further, there is no
reason why scholars should take on faith the validity of the
assumptions and premises and statistical analyses that the Treasury
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Department uses in determining revenue effects. Thus, private
studies of this type seem valuable.
But where is the lawyer to participate? Lawyers began this
study, obtained the financing for it, and employed the staff. They
also suggested certain changes in the tax law which might be
studied. But these seem minimal contributions, and if lawyers are
to assume a substantial role in broad and major tax reforms, they
will have to view their participation in this sort of project as a begin-
ning and not as an end.
The failing of the lawyers is in part their eschewing any role
in making policy judgments about tax reform based on the findings
of the economists. When the Treasury Department studies revenue
effects of particular changes in the tax law, Congress must then come
to grips with the policy question of whether the law should be
changed. At this point, advocates for both change and the status
quo begin to urge on Congress the second and third-order effects of
the changes proposed. Lawyers participate with gusto and
competence in this advocacy. Thus, the elimination of favorable
treatment for capital gains would evoke a flood of objections which
would largely ignore the revenue implications and address
themselves to the harm to the economy, the locking in of capital to
existing investments, the harm in reducing the liquidity of
investments, etc. Advocates for change might point to such things
as the increase in dividend pay-outs by corporations, and a possible
increase thereby in consumption expenditures. Thus, the second and
third-order effects of the revenue changes would be carefully
weighed against first-order effects in the political arena when it
came time to make judgments about the suggested changes. The
tudy barely touched upon the second and third-order effects. This is
understandable because of the limited financing available. However,
the project recently has obtained new backing, and it can be hoped
that it will devote more research to the economic activities of
taxpayers resulting* from changes in the law, and then refine the
first-order revenue effects to fit the resulting model.
In a multi-disciplinary study of tax policy, the lawyers could
function most effectively if they would not disavow their role as
policy makers. In Congress they frequently assume this position,
the Section of Taxation has frequently expressed the desire to do
so, and it is puzzling that the Committee on Substantive Tax
Reform has gone out of its way, in earlier statements as well as in the
recently published study, to disclaim any judgment role in setting tax
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policy. With the data now available from the economists, the Com-
mittee should move forward in evaluating the results and making
recommendations for a position' on broad-based tax reform.
Admittedly, the study is not complete enough for hardened
positions to be taken, but tentative judgments could be made and in
this way a dialogue could be commenced which would be useful in
continuing the project with the additional funds now available.
It does appear that the lawyers in the project played a role at
the beginning of the study in determining what changes in the tax
law should be studied. This was a necessary task and one which
the lawyers were well equipped to play. But, in this undertaking,
the lawyers have fallen short of the quality of work which one
expects from the Section of Taxation. As the Director of the
project, Arthur Willis, explains in chapter two, the lawyers are
better equipped than the economists to evaluate the practicalities of
a particular change. Mr. Willis points out that economists are
accustomed to dealing with masses of data, whereas the lawyers
experience changes in the tax system from the viewpoint of
individual taxpayers. The ensuing dialogue between the economists
and the lawyers, Mr. Willis says, "may enable them to agree
whether, on balance, the proposal should be advocated (perhaps
with modifications) or must be dropped as impractical." This does
appear to be a valid commentary on the respective roles which
economists and lawyers can play in a multi-disciplinary study of
tax reform. However, lawyers must train themselves to see the
viewpoint of the individual taxpayers who may never see a tax
lawyer and those too poor to have a tax obligation. This group
comprises by far the largest number of people in our society and
lawyers have little or no experience with them. Their experience is
with larger individual taxpayers and corporate taxpayers. If the
dialogue is carried on between economists on the one hand and
lawyers constrained by their own practical experience with large
clients, it may totally fail to reach an equitable solution for the tax
law. Louis Eisenstein's gloomy assessment of the tax bar as "a
strange excuse for great expectations" in the field of tax reform would
then seem uncomfortaby close to the truth
An example of this possibility is put in sharp focus by the
published studies. One of the changes studied by the project was the
2 L. EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION 205 (1961).
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effect of imputing rent on owner-occupied homes. From the
comments of the Otts, as well as the special study by Robert W.
Tenny, it is apparent that a good deal of time and effort was
devoted to making accurate estimates of the amounts of imputed
rent in each adjusted gross income class. A lawyer whose
experience has been with corporate clients, and relatively
sophisticated individual taxpayers, might well accept this change in
the law as feasible. He might view it as unpopular but worth
studying because of the desire to achieve fairness or equity on a
horizontal level. However, a lawyer placing himself in the situation
of the many unsophisticated taxpayers who may own low-value
homes would at once perceive the political impracticality of
persuading the bulk of the American public to accept this type of
imputed income ds real taxable ihcome. Not only would there be
vast difficulties in estimating the income involved, but it seems
fairly predictable that to attempt this change in the law would
jeopardize the entire self-enforcement system. Just as taxpayers
tend to ignore their gambling winnings as income not appropriate
for the tax to reach, it seems probable that most taxpayers would
balk at paying a tax on the imputed rent of owner-occupied houses.
They would no doubt protest by simply failing to report this
income or greatly underestimating it. Thus, to enforce such a law
would involve vast administrative complexities and an extremely
expensive enforcement system. With the limited funds that were
available this is one place where the lawyers should have said to the
economists that the project should ignore such income, no matter
how appealing it might be to the economists as a source of revenue
and equity.
On the other hand, a glaring omission from the changes in the
tax law that were studied was the excess of percentage depletion
over cost depletion. It seems highly unlikely that the economists
would not have wanted to include this item when attempting to
broaden the tax base. One can only conclude that the lawyers, in
their dialogue with the economists, persuaded them that a change
of this type should be dropped as impractical. Once again,
proceeding from the experience of representing corporate clients
and large and sophisticated taxpayers, this conclusion might be
understandable. A proposal to change to cost depletion would
provoke a storm of protest in the Congress by relatively large and
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special interests. Lawyers would be all too aware of this because of
their experience with their clients. But a lawyer considering the
reaction of individual small taxpayers might well conclude that they
would approve of such a change. Since they form a majority of the
voting public, it seems quite possible that such a change in the tax
law could be viewed as a practical one when broad and
fundamental changes in tax policy are being reviewed.
On the positive side, several studies were of particular interest.
The project considered four different methods of revising the
present taxation of corporate income and dividends in order to
carry out the charge of the American Bar Association to study
ways of ameliorating or eliminating the double taxation of
corporate income. Although this concept of double taxation is a
shibboleth common to lawyers who have given no thought to the
shifting of the burden of the income tax by corporations, the
comparison of the different methods was of interest and should be
useful in carrying on a continuing dialogue about the desirability of
making a fundamental change in this vital area of the tax law.
The study was at its best when it approached alternative
negative income tax plans and compared not only the cost of these
plans but the efficiency in raising families from poverty levels to
income levels above the poverty line. If the assumptions on which
the studies proceeded were valid, and the costs and efficiencies
relatively accurate, the study could be quite useful in establishing
the best approach to a negative income tax. Again, however, the
validity of these studies is beyond my understanding, given
the meager explanation of method contained in this book.
Another portion of the study which appears to hold promise for
future usefulness was the correlation of income tax return statistics
with other statistical information provided by the federal
government, being primarily the Federal Reserve Board's survey of
financial characteristics of consumers and the Bureau of Labor
Statistics' survey of consumer expenditures. Since tax returns are
not filed on a family basis, while the other government statistics are
accumulated on a family basis, it was necessary for the project to
devote substantial effort to reconciling this data. Furthermore, the
tax return information is incomplete in not providing data with
respect to non-filers. The study that the project made to
incorporate into its statistics the information with respect to non-
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filers would also seem to be useful, providing the methodology
yields a relatively accurate result.
For the future, I hope that the Section of Taxation can broaden
its horizons and objectives so that it can play a more important
role in this type of study and in the setting of tax policy. I would
make two suggestions for the Section's consideration, both of
which could be carried on as a continuation of this substantive tax
reform project. The Section now has a Special Committee on
Substantive Tax Reform and there appears no reason why this
committee could not continue to function and provide continuity to
the project which has just been published.
First, the Committee should form recommendations as to broad
and fundamental tax policies and submit these to the Section for
comment and debate. From this I would hope that lawyers
throughout the country would ultimately become better informed
about the nature of an efficient and fair tax system and become
effective advocates for improving our system.
Second, and perhaps most important, the Special Committee on
Substantive Tax Reform should turn its attention to practical ways
of achieving a transition from the present tax system to what it
would view as a better system. We know that Canada's Royal
Commission on Taxation has performed a monumental task in
restudying the entire Canadian system and proposing a major
overhaul of that system. Yet it has not been adopted and the
problems involved in making such sweeping changes in a tax law
may be more than can be overcome in a political arena. Whenever
a tax law is changed, there is some redistribution of the burden of
taxation. Some individuals pay more and others pay less. It is
inevitable that this fact will cause distortions in the economy and
substantial protests from the taxpayers adversely affected. Even
those who are benefitted will frequently object strenuously. A good
example of this in recent times is the loud objections voiced by
many segments of American business to President Kennedy's
proposal for an investment credit. Once adopted, however, it
became quite popular and businessmen now argue strenuously that
it should not be removed. Thus, changes do create objections from
substantial numbers of taxpayers and lines of economic competition
that have been drawn under an existing statute must be redrawn
whenever the tax law affects that competitive posture.
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One possible method of transition which holds promise can be
found in the tax reform proposals submitted by the Treasury
Department to President Johnson in December, 1968. These
proposals, under consideration by the House Ways and Means
Committee during the first half of 1969, include a so-called
minimum income tax. Obviously, a minimum income tax involves
a redefinition of the taxable base. The redefinition of the taxable
base must necessarily broaden the taxable base from what the
Internal Revenue Code provides for most taxpayers. As it stands in
the Treasury proposal, the minimum tax would not affect many
taxpayers. The great majority of them would continue to pay on
the limited tax base with the higher tax rates. It is apparent that if
the rate structures applied to the minimum tax base and to the
conventional tax base are gradually changed so that the minimum
tax rates become greater and the conventional tax rates are
reduced, the minimum tax would apply to more and more
taxpayers. This could provide the means by which a gradual shift,
over a period of years, could be made from our present tax system
to a substantially reformed tax system containing a much
broadened tax base. A gradual shift of this sort would provide
ample opportunity for the competitive economic lines to be redrawn
and adjusted to the new tax system and would not affect large
numbers of taxpayers in any one year. I suggest that this is one of
the areas which could be fruitfully studied if the project of the
Special -Committee on Substantive Tax Reform were to be
continued.
In any event, this pilot project marks a new beginning of sorts
in the attempts of lawyers and economists to work together effec-
tively in the area of public finance. One cannot be overly critical
of the failures of a beginning. Rather, one can be optimistic that we
can learn from this and find more meaningful ways for lawyers to
contribute to these broad policy questions. Their interest need not
be transient; their expertise need not be superficial. Thus, this
publication should be taken as an encouraging sign that lawyers are
desirous of using their talents in this endeavor and are willing to
devote their time, energy and money in finding ways to do so.
Richard D. Hobbet*
* Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A. 1949, J.D. 195 1, University of Iowa.
1115Vol. 1969: 1107]

